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 1. Introduction  
 
The power reform drivers in developed and developing countries have been 
different, even though the mechanisms are relatively similar. Developed 
countries opted for restructuring the sector in order to improve the economic 
performance of a well-developed industry by competition, (Ghanadan and 
Williams, 2006). In developing countries by contrast, (1) the low performance of 
state-owned power companies, (2) the need to raise investments for satisfying 
demand, (3) the need to reduce or eliminate the fiscal stress from state 
involvement and (4) the desire to increase revenues through the sale of power 
companies, among others, were the main drivers for the reform, (Besant-Jones, 
2006).  
 
The reform in Peru began in 1992 with the promulgation of the Electric 
Concession Law - LCE. The starting conditions, similar to other developing 
countries, were unfavourable. The poor performance of companies, cross 
subsidy policies, political intervention in price regulation, among others; were 
the main drivers. In addition adverse macroeconomic conditions and terrorist 
threats made the picture worse (World Bank, 1990). Peru like many other 
countries, has applied a standard reform model which includes the creation of 
independent regulator, unbundling, privatisation and wholesale competition, 
(United Nations, 2007; Jamasb, 2006). Retail competition in distribution, has not 
been possible since the electricity regulatory framework does not allow the 
presence of retailers. The power reform also allowed the unbundling of the 
generation, transmission and distribution activities, being Electroperu and 
Electrolima the two state-owned companies that were subject to this de-merger. 
The application of this regulatory scheme has produced important achievements 
in the electricity distribution sector. The expansion of electricity coverage, the 
reduction of distribution losses and improvements in quality issues (duration 
and number of interruptions) are among the main indicators that support this 
fact. We expect that these improvements can be translated into benefits for the 
society.  
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The aim of this paper is to measure the social welfare of the restructuring and 
privatisation of the distribution market. Electrolima and Electro Sur Medio are 
the companies on which we focus1. A cost benefit analysis will be performed, 
following the methodology discussed in Jones et al. (1990). As a result, the gains 
(or losses) from restructuring and privatisation will be calculated. Based on the 
social welfare of being connected determined by the World Bank it was possible 
to calculate the gains due to the increase of electricity coverage. A counterfactual 
scenario was used for this calculation. Total gains for restructuring and 
privatisation includes the social welfare of being connected. Quality issues such 
as distribution losses and number and duration of interruptions, will be also 
discussed with reference to both private and state-owned distribution 
companies.  
 
This paper is a very instructive case study which will contribute to improve our 
understanding of the deregulation process in developing markets in the South 
American region.  The study is organised in six sections. The next section 
describes the industry background. Section 3 sets out briefly the previous efforts 
for evaluating the impact of restructuring and privatisation and describes the 
cost benefit analysis methodology to be used. Section 4 presents the data 
collection. Section 5 shows the analysis of the results and includes the evaluation 
of additional benefits. Section 6 provides the conclusions.  
 
 
 
 2. Background   
 
Electrolima, the biggest distribution company was initially private. After several 
decades of private electricity ownership it was nationalized in 1972. In the same 
year, Electroperu, a state-owned company, was created and had exclusive rights 
on national generation expansion. The company was also responsible for 
managing the electricity sector nationwide, especially in areas not served by the 
main existing companies2. Sectors that were also involved in the nationalisation 
programme were agricultural, mining, petrol and others3. 
 
                                                 
1 Electrolima and Electro Sur Medio were the first two distribution companies to be privatised in 1994 and 
1997 respectively. In 2007 Electro Sur Medio and the three companies that were created due to the 
unbundling of Electrolima, accounted for 63.8 per cent of the total energy sold in the distribution electricity 
market with a total of 1.92 million customers. Electro Sur Medio and the unbundled companies from 
Electrolima account for 100 per cent of the privatised distribution electricity market. The biggest 
distribution companies unbundled from Electrolima, Luz del Sur and Edelnor, operate in northern and 
southern Lima respectively.  
2 Before 1972 a big number of private and public small electricity companies operated nationwide. In terms 
of installed power the distribution was as follows: (1) 267 MW for public sector, (2) 809 MW for private 
sector and (3) 854 MW for self producers companies such as mines, industrial companies, etc. The intention 
was to integrate those systems (private and public) in order to have a more efficient operation 
(CONEIMERA, 2006)  
3 The nationalization programme continued until the 80s. The number of state-owned companies increased 
from 29 in 1968 to 177 in 1990. However, the bad performance of these companies produced an aggregated 
net loss of US$ 531 million (World Bank, 1994) 
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In terms of prices, the Electric Tariff Commission (CTE) was the autonomous 
agency responsible for price regulation4. During the period 1985-1990, the tariff 
structure was based on accounting costs and marginal costs were greater than 
prices. In 1989 prices covered only 40 per cent of cost and the net operational 
losses represented 152 per cent of incomes by energy sold5. In addition, even 
though the autonomy for regulating the electricity tariffs was given to the CTE, 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance had a strong intervention in price 
regulation. At the beginning of 1990s there were around 27 types of tariffs for 
end users.  The imposition of taxes in customers’ bills was also a concern. In 
1991 CTE put into practice a new tariff system based on marginal cost and as a 
result tariffs increased and the non related taxes were repealed from the 
customers’ bill. The sale and purchase of electricity among companies was not 
derived from a price mechanism either. Instead, a Generation Compensation 
Fund – Fondo de Compensación de Generación, was used. This fund was created 
to compensate the cost differences in generation and transmission activities 
among electricity companies, produced as a result of having different sources of 
energy production, production scales and market structures6. The new tariff 
system allowed also the purchase of energy between electricity distribution 
companies and Electroperu.  
 
Regarding the market structure, at the beginning of the 1990’s Electroperu, the 
regional companies7 and the isolated systems accounted for 70 per cent of the 
national electricity supply8 (Bonifaz, 2001). Electrolima, the main electricity 
distribution company, was responsible for 57 per cent of the national electricity 
consumption and had its own generation installation for electricity production 
(Araoz, et al., 2001). The nationwide transmission system was composed of three 
sub systems: (1) the Central Northern Grid - SICN, (2) the South Western Grid – 
SISO and (3) the South Eastern Grid – SISE and the isolated systems. The main 
sector authorities were the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MINEM) through the 
General Bureau of Electricity (DGE) along with the Electric Tariff Commission.  
 
Due to the lack of progress on the sector, the Government began the most 
important sector reform through the launch of the Electricity Concession Law 
(LCE) in November 1992. The reforms involved: unbundling, privatisation and 
wholesale competition. This reform was based on the Chilean model. Both use a 
hybrid mechanism for regulating distribution prices; rate of return and model 
firm in Peru; yardstick and model firm in Chile (Bonifaz, 2001; Dammert et al., 
2008)  The LCE focused on the following elements: (1) unbundling of state-
owned companies, mainly Electroperu and Electrolima, in generation, 
transmission and distribution activities, (2) creation of a free market, which 
allowed customers with a capacity greater than 1 MW, to negotiate their supply 
contract freely, (3) the establishment of the Economic Operation Committee – 
                                                 
4 The CTE was created under the General Electricity Law (LGE) in 1982.     
5 CTE Annual Reports (1986-1990). 
6 Electrolima was the most affected which transferred important sum of money to the less profitable 
companies.  
7 Among the regional companies were: Electrolima and those companies that were created under the 
General Electricity Law in 1982. The companies are: Electro Sur, Electro Sur Medio, Electro Sur Este, 
Electrocentro, Seal, Electro Norte, Electro Norte Medio, Electro Noroeste and Electro Oriente 
8 The remaining was produced by private auto generation companies for their own consumption.  
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COES, a private entity that coordinates the operation system at the lowest 
possible cost, and (4) the creation of the Energy Tariff Commission, which later 
on became the Tariff Regulator Office – GART9. In December 1996 the 
Supervising Agency for Investment in Energy (OSINERG)10, an independent 
regulatory agency, was created.  
 
The launch of the LCE along with the Law for the Promotion of Private 
Investment in State Enterprises, prepared the scenario for the privatisation 
process in the electricity market. The last one authorised the creation of the 
Commission for managing and promoting the private investment – COPRI. 
Electrolima and Electroperu were unbundled into several new companies11. In 
most of the cases, the strategy was to transfer 60 per cent of the state-owned 
shares through public auctions to companies that accomplish technical and 
financial requirements imposed by the different Commissions. The sale of state-
owned shares to workers was also a practice and represented a maximum of 10 
per cent. The Government decided to retain the rest of shares for a subsequent 
sale through the scheme “Participacion Ciudadana” that involved selling shares 
in the stock market. This approach was used in the sale of generation and 
distribution companies. Other mechanisms were used as well such as the sale 
through capital investment and by Built Own Operate Transfer (BOOT), for 
generation and transmission companies, respectively. In addition to the above, a 
30 year operating concession was established. As a result, a significant number of 
new companies were reformed and privatised during the period 1994-2004, 
including regional distribution companies12. At the end of 2007, generation, 
transmission and distribution markets were private to the share of 66.62 per 
cent, 98.95 per cent and 64.23 per cent respectively13. The total amount raised by 
the sale of the companies was US$ 3.3 billion from which generation, 
transmission and distribution accounted for 55.2 per cent, 17.4 per cent and 27.4 
per cent, respectively. See Table 1.  
 
In summary, the restructuring and privatisation of the electricity market is 
considered favourable, (COPRI, 2000; Ruiz, 2002; Torero, 2003; Alcazar et al., 
2007; Dammert et al., 2008; Perez-Reyes and Tovar, 2009). Among other Latin 
American countries with positive results are Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Colombia, (Chisari et al., 1997; Mota, 2003; Pollitt, 2004; Larsen et al., 2004;). In 
                                                 
9 The CTE and OSINERG, the energy regulator, merged in July 2000. GART is part of OSINERG.  
10 In January 2007 it became OSINERGMIN due to the extension of its duties in the mining regulatory arena.  
11 Electrolima was divided into four distribution companies: (1) Luz del Sur, (2) Edelnor, (3) Ede Chancay, 
(4) Ede Cañete; one generation (1) Edegel and one transmission company (1) Etecen. Electroperu was 
partially unbundled and four generation companies were created (1) Egenor, (2) Cahua, (3) Etevensa and 
(4) Eepsa.  Electro Sur Medio, a regional company, remained bundled. In 1996 Ede Chancay was acquired by 
Edelnor.  
12 In 1998 four additional distribution companies were sold, Electro Norte, Electro Norte Medio, 
Electrocentro and Electro Nor Oeste. After nearly three years of operation, the four companies returned to 
the government because the buyer did not exercise its option to purchase the remaining 30 per cent of 
shares. These companies now operate under the name Distriluz and are outside of the common legal 
framework for public companies. The privatisation process has been suspended. Other regional companies 
that were included in the privatisation package were Electro Sur, Seal, Electro Sur Este, Electro Oriente and 
Electro Ucayali. However the government was forced to suspend the privatisation programme due to public 
protests and the opposition of the privatisation of the southern generation companies (Egasa, Egesur) in 
2002. This fact had negative repercussions in privatisation plan of the pending regional companies.   
13 In terms of energy sale for generation and distribution companies and in terms of length of transmission 
line for transmission companies.  
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Peru, the electricity coverage increased significantly reaching 80 per cent in 
2007 up from 53 per cent in 1990. Regarding total distribution losses, an 
important downturn was also observed, having moved from 22 per cent in 1993 
to 8.2 per cent in 2007. The number of customers per employee14 also increased. 
It jumped from 415 to 1,210 in 2007 (CTE, 1986-1999; OSINERGMIN, 2000-
2007). 
                                                 
14 Regarding the electricity distribution companies.  
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1. Generation Companies Date Buyers Offer price
Initial 
company 
participation Total
Investments Installations (MW) Stock market % date Workers date % Hydro Thermal Total % (US$ million) %
(US$ million) (US$ million) (US$ million) (US$ million) (US$ million) (US$ million)
Edegel 1/ Nov-95 Generandes 373 524.45 60% 42.00 100 139.22 30%
Apr-99 / 
Nov-99 / 
Jan-00 74.8 Jul-96 10% 780.47 4,443.42 3,344.44 7,787.86 28.38% 335.07 22.61%
Egecen - Energía del Sur 2/ Feb-04 Enersur n.a. 62.05 100% 146.87 130 -- -- -- -- -- -- 208.92 784.62 3,081.91 3,866.53 14.09% 259.25 17.49%
Egenor - Duke Energy Aug-96 Inversiones Dominion 175 228.20 60% 42.00 100 60.00 30% Oct-99 36.3 Nov-96 10% 366.50 2,060.51 125.20 2,185.71 7.97% 145.81 9.84%
Electroandes Dec-01 Tractebel n.a. 227.10 100% 17.50 n.a. -- -- -- -- -- -- 244.60 976.04 -- 976.04 3.56% 55.41 3.74%
Eepsa 3/ Nov-96 Consorcio Cabo Blanco n.a. 19.70 60% 40.00 80 -- -- -- -- -- -- 59.70 -- 601.00 601.00 2.19% 62.35 4.21%
Cahua 4/ May-95 Sipesa 21.12 41.81 60% -- -- 9.00 30% Mar-00 6.67 Oct-96 10% 57.48 527.58 0.36 527.94 1.92% 25.75 1.74%
Etevensa 5/ Jan-96 Consorcio Generalima 65 120.10 60% -- 280 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.44 Nov-96 1.78% 123.54 -- -- -- -- -- --
2. Transmission Companies Date Buyers
Reservation 
price Offer price
Tx. 
Lines 
(US$ million) (US$ million) 220 KV 138KV <75KV Total % (US$ million) %
Red de Energía del Perú 
(ETECEN, ETESUR) 6/ Sep-02 Interconexión Eléctrica 250.00 261.99 63 3,073.67 1,237.51 30.40 4,341.58 64.03% 65.30 49.64%
Consorcio Transmantaro 7/ Feb-98
Hydro Quebec 
International 300.00 179.18 4 603.03 -- -- 603.03 8.89% 28.86 21.93%
Red Eléctrica del Sur 7/, 8/ Mar-99 Red Eléctrica de España 92.50 74.48 4 427.75 -- -- 427.75 6.31% 10.82 8.22%
Interconexión Eléctrica ISA 
Perú 9/ Apr-01 Interconexión Eléctrica n.a. 65.40 5 261.72 130.52 -- 392.24 5.78% 10.09 7.67%
3. Distribution Companies Date Buyers
Reservation 
price Offer price
Initial 
company 
participation Total 15/
Present 
state 
ownership
Present 
owners
(includes those that returned Investments Installations (MW) Stock market % date Workers date % No % (US$ million) %
to government) (US$ million) (US$ million) (US$ million) (US$ million) (US$ million) (US$ million)
Luz del Sur 10/ Aug-94 Ontario - Quinta AVV 129.42 212.12 60% -- 172.56 30.0%
Dec-
96/Feb-99 32.40 Jul-96 10.0% 417.08 0% Endesa 777,289 17.8% 439.83 31.66%
Edelnor Aug-94 Inversiones Distrilima 127.72 176.49 60% -- 94.24 36.3% Mar-02 10.89 Jul-95 3.7% 281.62 0%
Ontario - 
Quinta AVV 986,365 22.6% 418.75 29.63%
Ede Chancay 11/ Dec-95 Inversiones Distrilima 10.35 10.36 60% -- -- -- -- 0.12 Apr-96 1.8% 10.48 0% Endesa -- -- -- --
Electro Sur Medio 12/ Mar-97 Consorcio HICA 35.00 25.64 100% 25.64 -- -- -- -- -- -- 51.28 0% Iate 130,701 3.0% 43.33 3.19%
Ede Cañete 13/ Jul-96 Luz del Sur 8.20 8.62 100% -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8.62 0%
Ontario - 
Quinta AVV 27,210 0.6% 6.99 0.52%
Electro Norte Medio 14/ Dec-98 Jose Rodriguez Banda 36.08 67.88 30% -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6.79 97.40% Government 469,967 10.8% 103.43 7.04%
Electrocentro 14/ Dec-98 Jose Rodriguez Banda 26.28 32.69 30% -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3.27 100% Government 433,576 9.9% 67.52 4.27%
Electro Nor Oeste 14/ Dec-98 Jose Rodriguez Banda 12.96 22.89 30% -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.29 100% Government 279,266 6.4% 60.12 4.27%
Electro Norte 14/ Dec-98 Jose Rodriguez Banda 11.35 22.12 30% -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.21 100% Government 247,389 5.7% 48.55 3.33%
1/ US$ 273 million cash and US$ 100 millio. in debt title. The offer price includes both. 
2/ Includes US$ 124.51 million (usufruct right) and US$ 22.36 million (social contribution) 
3/ A capitalization investment modality and the transference of shares w as used. The sale of 40% of state ow ned shares is still pending 
4/ 20% cash and 80% in 8 years, interest rate= Libor (180 d) + 2%
5/ A capitalization investment modality w as used. 60% of the state ow nership's shares w as sold for US$ 120 million (investment). It w as absorved by EDEGEL in June 2006.
6/ Includes the base price for 30 years of concession (US$ 229.59 million) and spares stock, materials, assets (US$  20.41 million). 
7/ The company that proposed the low est investment cost (based on a project implementation) w as selected. Form of project f inancing: Build-Ow n-Operate-Transfer (BOOT)
8/ Transmission lines in concession: Socabaya-Moquegua, Moquegua - Puno, Moquegua-Tacna.
9/ Transmission lines in concession:  Pachachaca-Oroya, La Oroya-Carhuamayo-Derivación Antamina, Aguaytía-Pucallpa
10/ The previous name w as Edelsur
11/ Ede Chancay w as sold to Edelnor at the end of 1996
12/ The government established the payment of 50% by cash and/or credit and the other 50% in investments. The company agreed: 20% cash and 80% in 8 years, interest rate= Libor (180 d) + 2% 
13/ The f irst auction w as declared void
14/ The government established the payment of 10% by cash and 90% by credit (12 years, including a 3 years pay off , interest rate=Libor (180d) + 2%). Due to the lack of payment the four companies returned to the government in 2001
15/ For the companies that w ere privatised temporarily only 10% of the offer price is considered as recaudation. 
16/ Market share in terms of total market (privatised, private and public)
 Source: CEPREL (1997), COPRI (2000),MINEM (2006), MINEM (2007), OSINERGMIN (2006), OSINERGMIN(2007), Proinversión, Libro Blanco from Regional Electricity Companies 
Commitments
Transmission Line (Km) - 2006 Income - 2007 16/
Sale of state-owned shares
Number of 
customers - 2007
Energy sold - 2007 
16/
Commitments Sale of state-owned sharesReservation 
price
Energy production (GWh) - 2007
Energy sold - 2007 
16/
Table 1: Privatisation of the Electricity Market 
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 3. Methodology  
 
Many empirical studies attempt to measure the impact of restructuring and 
privatisation of public utilities using different methodologies. One of the most 
popular and pioneering is the analysis of financial and physical indicators of 
performance. Among the literature that supports this is Hutchinson (1991), 
Megginson et al. (1994), Bishop and Green (1995), Boubakri and Cosset (1998), 
La Porta et al. (1999), Estache et al. (2001), Torero (2003). Selected indicators 
are compared pre and post privatisation in order to measure any improvement. 
The following category involves the use of labour and total factor productivity, 
Bishop and Thompson (1992), Parker and Martin (1995), O’ Mahoney (1998). 
Other empirical studies are based on the use of frontier methodologies, such as 
Data Envelopment Analysis or Stochastic Frontier Analysis. Here productivity 
inefficiency is determined by the distance from the frontier. Examples of this 
grouping are Pollitt (1995), Bonifaz (2001), Kirkpatrick et al. (2004), Mota 
(2004), Giannakis et al. (2005), Margaretic and Romero (2007), Perez-Reyes and 
Tovar (2009). The last category, which is included in this empirical study, 
focuses on a social cost-benefit analysis. In comparison with the categories 
previously cited, this one also measures the broader welfare impact due to 
privatisation and also the individual effect among the different parties 
(customers, producers and government). It goes further than the comparison of 
performance indicators and the measurement of productivity. Among the 
empirical studies that support this approach are Galal et al. (1994), Newbery and 
Pollitt (1997), Domah and Pollitt (2001), Mota, R. (2003), Boardman et al. 
(2007), Wolf and Pollitt (2008). All these studies are based on the methodology 
described in Jones et al. (1990), which is also the one to be used in this study.  
 
3.1 Social Cost-Benefit Methodology 
 
The social cost-benefit analysis proposed by Jones et al. (1990) allows us to 
evaluate the impact of privatisation in terms of (1) efficiency gains from 
restructuring and privatisation and (2) distributional impact. The first concept 
measures the overall gains and the second one the gains (or losses) per actor 
(Government, Consumers and Producers). The methodology involves a 
counterfactual scenario and differs from others which are focused basically on 
financial and performance indicators, labour and total factor productivity and 
productivity. The counterfactual scenario, that simulates the continuation of 
government ownership, will be constructed in order to be compared with the 
scenario under privatisation. 
 
( ) ZpgVsgVspW ∗−+−=Δ λλ ……………..(1) 
 
Where: Vsp : social value under private operation, Vsg : social value under 
government operation, λg : shadow multiplier on government revenue, λp : 
shadow multiplier on private funds, Z : actual price of the executed sale.  
 
( ) Z*λp-λgΔProd*λpΔGovλgΔConλcΔW ++∗+∗= …………….(2) 
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Where: ΔCon : Surplus of the consumer, ΔGov : Surplus of government, ΔProd : 
Surplus of producers, λc: Shadow multiplier on consumer surplus. 
 
Following Newbery and Pollitt (1997) and Mota (2003), from a policy maker 
position, government revenue would be more appropriate as a numeraire for the 
measure of welfare. Under this approach, the idea is to determine the shadow 
multipliers based on the shadow multiplier on government revenue. The shadow 
multipliers represent the weight that different parties have in the social welfare 
function. 
 
Following Jones et al. (1990), expression (1) is referred to the fundamental 
formula of divestiture, while the difference between social value under private 
and government operation is called the Difference Principle. When the variation 
in welfare is greater than zero (ΔW >0) it may be stated that privatisation was 
socially worthwhile. The social value is represented by the operating controllable 
costs (under private or public scenario) net of restructuring and privatisation 
costs15.  
 
Regarding expression (2), surplus of consumer is given by the difference 
between the private and counterfactual net average revenue16. The surplus of 
government is given by the difference between private and counterfactual taxes, 
which can be computed by projecting tax rates over operating profits. Tax rates 
are estimated using actual tax paid. The surplus of producers is obtained after 
subtracting the government and consumers’ net gains from the total net benefits 
(ΔW).  
 
In both scenarios, different values of shadow factors are assumed in order to 
analyse their impact in the social welfare. All values are aggregated on a present 
value basis. 
 
3.2 Adjustments 
 
Generation and transmission costs, purchase of energy and other issues, were 
excluded from the total operating costs in order to obtain the operating 
controllable costs17. Due to the lack of generation and transmission costs for the 
period 1986-1993, some approximations were made, see Appendix 1. Table 2 
shows the detail of the actual consolidated accounts for the period 1986 – 2007 
for the target companies. In order to measure the surplus of the consumers, it 
was also required to make some adjustments in terms of assets. Assets in the 
target companies were not disaggregated by activity. Generation and 
transmission assets were subtracted from Electrolima total assets and only 
                                                 
15 Net operating controllable costs = total operating costs – (generation costs + transmission costs + 
purchase of energy costs + depreciation + operating non-controllable costs) 
16 Counterfactual net average revenue = counterfactual operating profits + counterfactual operating 
controllable costs + operating non-controllable costs + depreciation. Counterfactual operating profit is 
computed using a rate of return on tangible fixed assets. Counterfactual operating controllable costs are 
calculated from unit counterfactual controllable costs taking into account a counterfactual cost decline. 
17 This study concentrates on the distribution business, other business such as generation and transmission 
were excluded.   
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generation assets were reduced from Electro Sur Medio. The last one did not 
report any transmission assets in the balance sheet.  
 
3.3 The Counterfactual and Projected Scenarios 
 
Electrolima and Electro Sur Medio were privatised in different years, 1994 and 
1997. Both companies differed considerably in size18, thus a separate 
counterfactual and projected scenario was performed. For the construction of 
counterfactual and projected figures some assumptions were made, see Section 
3.4.  
 
In order to calculate unit operating controllable costs regarding Electrolima, the 
cost trend for the period 1986-1993 was analysed. The actual figures show that 
for the years 1986-1989 there is not a clear trend in real terms. One explanation 
may be the high inflation rate in the late 1980’s19. Thus an analysis for the last 
three years prior to the sale was performed. The unit operating cost was 
obtained calculating the average unit operating controllable costs for these years, 
due to these twofold reasons (1) if we only consider the period 1991-1992 we 
may be capturing any effect of the inflation rate and (2) if we only include the 
period 1992-1993 we can be absorbing additional costs incurred by the company 
before the sale. Therefore a way to smooth any impact under both scenarios is to 
compute the average for the whole period 1991-1993.   
                                                 
18 The average energy sold for the period 1986-1993 was 4.6TWh (Electrolima) and 0.21TWh (Electro Sur 
Medio).   
19 For instance, in 1990 Peru faced a hyperinflation annual rate of 7,560 per cent. BCRP.  
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Table 2: Accounts for Electro Sur Medio, Electrolima and the unbundled companies (Edelnor, Luz del Sur, Ede Chancay, Ede Cañete) at real values 
 
2007 prices (US$ mio.) 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2,007
Total operating revenue 308 343 239 148 289 303 356 425 547 612 693 746 697 757 821 822 838 846 850 926 949 944
Energy sold 306 342 238 147 288 295 348 405 523 575 658 698 657 718 785 786 805 816 819 912 910 894
Other incomes 2 1 1 1 1 9 8 19 24 37 34 48 40 39 37 36 33 30 31 14 39 50
(-) Generation expenses 21 28 18 20 15 23 46 44 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
(-)Transmission expenses 8 10 6 7 5 7 7 11 0 1 6 16 17 18 16 18 21 21 21 0 11 20
(-)Purchase of energy 52 53 53 29 65 90 106 160 329 385 423 439 391 427 478 479 500 517 526 580 567 504
Operating revenue 227 252 161 91 205 184 197 210 217 222 263 290 288 311 326 324 317 307 303 345 370 419
Operating cost 253 263 210 195 272 188 152 182 224 176 182 191 177 176 172 169 169 165 171 208 208 191
(-)Depreciation 49 35 48 35 33 30 23 38 30 31 35 41 45 53 61 62 66 69 73 80 77 69
(-)R&P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
Net operating cost 204 229 162 160 239 158 129 140 192 145 138 150 132 124 111 106 98 96 98 128 131 122
(-) operating non controllable cost 104 100 73 57 158 63 36 4 6 2 2 8 7 9 9 9 9 9 11 12 12 11
Net operating controllable cost 100 129 89 103 81 94 92 136 186 143 136 142 125 115 102 97 88 87 86 116 120 111
Assets1/ 411 449 1,196 701 1,091 417 317 437 596 777 875 973 1,063 1,128 1,182 1,253 1,265 1,262 1,318 1,357 1,313 1,293
Operating profits -27 -11 -49 -104 -68 -4 45 28 -7 46 81 99 111 135 154 155 148 142 131 137 162 229
Taxes and workers participation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 15 21 27 26 53 58 59 54 58 62 45 54 55
Workers participation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 4 5 7 7 7 10 8 9 9
Taxes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 15 21 25 25 48 53 52 47 51 53 38 45 46
Units distributed (TW.h) 4.73 5.21 5.30 4.90 4.74 5.26 4.52 5.32 5.90 6.15 6.14 6.66 7.09 7.21 7.54 7.57 8.02 8.10 8.53 9.14 9.84 10.38
Employees 2/ 4,256 4,514 4,360 4,917 4,705 4,111 3,223 3,153 1,978 2,035 1,721 1,740 1,640 1,643 1,448 1,461 1,573 1,544 1,522 1,558 1,534 1,485
1/ Generation and transmission assets have been subtracted from total assets. 
2/ The number of employees from 1986 - 1993 only accounts for Electrolima employees. From 1994 it includes Electro Sur Medio employees and those from the unbundled company. 
Exchange rate: 3.13 (Soles/ US$)  
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In relation to Electro Sur Medio, a similar procedure was followed by the 
calculation of the target unit operating controllable costs. This company was sold 
in 1997; therefore the analysis is focused on the period 1994-1996. Thus, the 
average of unit operating controllable costs was computed using the accountings 
for the period 1994-1996. It is important to remark that even though the period 
1994-1996 was a more stable period (the inflation rate was much lower) in 
comparison with the period 1991-1993, the average unit operating controllable 
costs in this period differed only 2.6 per cent from the average unit operating 
controllable costs computed for the period 1994-199620. As expected, the unit 
operating controllable costs calculated for Electrolima is around 18 per cent 
lower than that from Electro Sur Medio. 
 
With the calculation of these unit operating costs the next step is to perform a 
sensitivity analysis using different annual cost fall rates, from 0 per cent to 4 per 
cent. That means for example that a 2 per cent p.a. fall in controllable costs under 
the counterfactual scenario implies that this cost will decrease 2 per cent p.a. In 
addition to the sensitivity analysis for the five cost fall rates, a central-case 
scenario related to the total efficiency gains and to the distributional gains is also 
discussed in this study. The unit operating cost is multiplied by the number of 
actual distributed units to obtain the total operating controllable costs for the 
period 1994-2007 (Electrolima) and period 1997-2007 (Electro Sur Medio). 
These costs are then compared with those from the actual scenario under private 
ownership. The efficiency cost savings are obtained from this difference, after 
aggregating on a present value basis with a specific discount rate. 
  
In terms of projections, it was assumed that the efficiency gap under both 
approaches, public and private ownership will be closed in the medium term and 
that prices would be the same. Following Pollitt and Smith (2002), 15 years 
would be an appropriate time to make this possible21. Total efficiency cost 
savings are computed by the difference between (1) the counterfactual and the 
counterfactual projected costs and (2) the actual and projected costs; aggregated 
of a present value basis.  
 
3.4 Assumptions  
 
Some assumptions were made for the construction of the counterfactual scenario 
and projections for computing the efficiency gains: 
 
1. The Wholesale Price Index (IPM22) is used for adjusting all the accountings. 
All figures are expressed in 2007 prices23.  
                                                 
20 The average unit operating controllable cost for the period 1991-1993 is 2.64 per cent higher than those 
for the period 1994-1996, in real terms.  
21 In summary, the cost benefit analysis will be performed from 1994 to 2022. Regarding the simulation of public 
ownership, figures from 1994 to 2007 refers to the counterfactual values and from 2008 to 2022 to the 
counterfactual projections. Regarding private ownership, figures from 1994 to 2007 are actual values and from 
2008 to 2022 are projected values.  
22 According to the National Accounting Regulatory Council, the IPM is the index used for the adjustment of 
companies’ financial statements. Electricity companies submitted both, historical and adjusted financial 
statements to OSINERGMIN until 2004. After that the submission of the adjusted accountings was not 
compulsory due to the low inflation rate in the last years.  
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2. A total of 5 discount rates24 were selected:  5 per cent, 6 per cent, 8 per cent, 
10 per cent and 12 per cent. A discount rate of 7.3 per cent is used for the 
central-case which represents the annual average reference interest rate in 
the 1990’s.   
3. Projections of the demand growth rate are based on the Electricity Reference 
Plan (Plan Referencial de Electricidad) (MINEM, 2008). 
4. Generation and transmission assets for the period 1986-1992 (Electrolima) 
and 1986-1994 and 1996 (Electro Sur Medio) remain the same in real values. 
Distribution assets are the same under public and private ownership. For 
projections, assets increase at the demand growth rate.  
5. The counterfactual operating profits are based on the average rate of return 
of assets for the period 1991-1993 (Electrolima) and period 1994-1996 
(Electro Sur Medio).  
6. Depreciation and operating non-controllable costs are the same under public 
and private scenarios. For projections, the depreciation rate is equal to 3.3 
per cent based on the lifetime of electricity connections25.  Projected 
operating non-controllable costs per KWh, regarding Electro Sur Medio and 
the companies that were unbundled from Electrolima, follow the same trend 
of their respective unit operating non-controllable costs after privatisation.  
7. The efficiency gap under public and private ownership will be closed in the 
following 15 years. For counterfactual projections, operating controllable 
costs will decrease to reach the same level of costs under the projected values 
(private ownership). These projected values were computed for each 
company based on the trend of unit operating controllable costs after 
privatisation.  
8. Prices under public and private ownership will be the same in the following 
15 years. Projected prices (private ownership) will decline to reach the same 
level of prices under the counterfactual projections. Projected prices were 
calculated for each company based on the trend of net revenues per KWh 
after privatisation.  
9. Tax rate is equal to the ratio of tax to operating profits26. A rate of 0 per cent 
for the first three years after privatisation (1995-1997 for Electrolima, and 
1997-1999 for Electro Sur Medio) and a rate of 30 per cent after these 
periods is assumed27.   
 
 4. Data Collection  
 
The companies’ financial statements for the target companies, Electrolima and 
Electro Sur Medio, were obtained from Annual Reports of the Electric Tariff 
Commission (period 1986 – 1999) and OSINERGMIN (2000 – 2007). Among the 
                                                                                                                                            
23 All calculations are made in Nuevo Soles, the Peruvian currency, and were adjusted using national 
accounts data. Then we use the 2007 exchange rate (US$/Soles) for presenting the results.   
24 Based on the reference interest rate established by the Peruvian Central Bank – BCRP. 
25 OSINERGMIN estimates a 30-year lifetime for calculating the connection costs. 
26 For the construction of the figures, taxes are composed of income tax and social contribution. Thus, tax 
rate refers to the combination of income taxes and social contribution over operating profits. In Peru the 
rate tax is equal to 30 per cent over operating profits. 
27 The tax trend payment in state-owned companies (Seal and Electro Norte Medio) was examined. These 
companies did not report tax payment after the first three years of being established the payment of taxes 
(in the financial sheets the item of “tax” appears from year 1994) Thus, we believe that the three-year 
interval is convenient.  
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data required were: revenues, total operating costs, operating controllable costs, 
taxes, compensation funds and transfers, purchase of energy, fuel expenses, 
depreciation, labour expenses, purchase of energy, taxes and social contribution, 
among others. In addition, the collection of physical data such as number of 
employees, distributed units and distribution losses were also obtained from 
these reports. Regarding the generation and transmission costs before 
privatisation, they were calculated using the Informational Memorandum and 
the Diagnostic Report both developed by the International Finance Corporation 
and Coppers & Lybrand respectively for CEPREL. These reports were found in 
the Libro Blanco28 from CEPREL. These costs are important for analysing the cost 
trend before privatisation in order to approximate the unit operating 
controllable costs. The generation assets were obtained from Electrolima and 
Electro Sur Medio Libro Blanco as well. The transmission assets regarding 
Electrolima were obtained from the Ministerial Resolution No 164-93-EM-VEM29.  
 
The restructuring and privatisation costs were collected from the Libro Blanco 
and from the National Public Treasury Office (Ministry of Economy and Finance). 
The IPM index and its specific adjustment factors30 were required for adjusting 
figures to 2007 prices, and for the calculation of generation and transmission 
costs before privatisation.  This was obtained from the National Accounting 
Regulatory Council (Ministry of Economy and Finance). See Appendix 2 for 
details.  
 
Figure 1 depicts the composition of revenue (actual values, 2007 prices) from the 
period 1986 – 2007, in terms of operating profits, net operating controllable 
costs, operating non-controllable costs, depreciation and restructuring and 
privatisation costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 “Libro Blanco” is a large report that contains important documents before the privatisation of Electrolima.   
29 This resolution established the transmission assets that would be transferred from Electrolima to the 
company Empresa de Transmisión Eléctrica Centro Norte. This company was created to operate the 
transmission business of Electrolima and Electroperu.  
30 Due to the high inflation rate in the late 1980’s, the adjustment factors were divided twofold: before 1990 
(initial adjustment) and after 1990 (final adjustment). See Resolutions No. 02-90-EF/93.01 and No. 03-93-
EF/93.01 from the National Accounting Authority (Consejo Normativo de Contabilidad) – Ministry of 
Economy and Finances. 
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Figure 1: Revenue composition per KWh for Electrolima, Electro Sur Medio, Edelnor, Luz del Sur, Ede 
Chancay and Ede Cañete  
(net of generation, transmission and purchase of energy payments) 
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 5. Results  
 
5.1 Efficiency Gains 
 
In this section the savings due to restructuring and privatisation of Electrolima 
and Electro Sur Medio are calculated. Both savings are then added in order to 
obtain the total gains. The net efficiency gains are calculated by subtracting 
restructuring and privatisation costs (R&P) from the gains explained by the 
controllable cost reduction. Table 3 shows the gains and losses under different 
scenarios for the whole period (including the future). Five discount rates were 
selected from 5 per cent to 12 per cent, based on the assumptions given in 
section 3.431. Net efficiency gains vary from US$ 4 million to US$ 705 million. If 
we believe that there would have been no cost variation (or a little variation) 
under state ownership the use of counterfactual cost fall of 0 per cent and 1 per 
cent would be more reasonable. For instance, with a counterfactual cost fall of 0 
per cent, gains would be US$ 627 million net of restructuring and privatisation 
costs at a discount rate of 6 per cent. On the other side, if we think that public 
sector would have been able to reduce costs significantly the use of a 
counterfactual cost fall of 3 per cent and 4 per cent would be more appropriate. 
With a counterfactual cost decline of 4 per cent, public sector ownership would 
be the best option at a discount rate of 12 per cent, with US$ 4 million in losses 
net of restructuring and privatisation costs. The use of a counterfactual cost 
decline of 2 per cent is a more impartial position in comparison with the four 
                                                 
31 For Electrolima’s savings, we calculated the present value for the period 1995-2007. The year 1994 was 
excluded because the sale of companies (Edelnor and Luz del Sur) was completed in August 1994. In the 
case of Electro Sur Medio, the computed period for the present value is 1997-2007. We include the year 
1997 because this sale was at the beginning of that year.  
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previous counterfactual cost falls. Gains vary from US$ 153 million to US$ 349 
million net of restructuring and privatisation costs.  
 
Table 3: Efficiency Gains 
 
Counterfactual cost fall
2007 prices (US$ million)
5% 6% 8% 10% 12%
Electrolima 
0% 687.3 611.8 489.0 395.1 322.3
1% 511.1 454.2 361.6 290.7 235.7
2% 349.8 309.8 244.7 194.8 156.0
3% 201.9 177.4 137.4 106.6 82.6
4% 66.4 56.0 38.9 25.5 15.0
Electro Sur Medio
0% 33.4 30.0 24.5 20.2 17.0
1% 23.7 21.3 17.5 14.5 12.2
2% 14.7 13.3 10.9 9.2 7.8
3% 6.2 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6
4% -1.7 -1.4 -0.9 -0.6 -0.3
Efficiency gains 
0% 720.7 641.8 513.5 415.3 339.3
1% 534.9 475.6 379.1 305.2 248.0
2% 364.5 323.1 255.6 203.9 163.8
3% 208.1 183.1 142.2 110.7 86.2
4% 64.7 54.7 38.0 24.9 14.7
Efficiency gains (% cost)
0% 25.4% 27.2% 29.0% 29.3% 28.7%
1% 18.9% 20.1% 21.4% 21.5% 21.0%
2% 12.9% 13.7% 14.4% 14.4% 13.9%
3% 7.3% 7.7% 8.0% 7.8% 7.3%
4% 2.3% 2.3% 2.1% 1.8% 1.2%
R&P 15.3 14.6 13.3 12.1 11.2
Discount rate
 
 
Table 4 shows the results from comparing net gains from restructuring and 
privatisation of the electricity distribution markets in England and Wales, Brazil 
and Peru. Gains are much higher in the first and second electricity markets in 
comparison with the third one32. This fact could be explained by the difference in 
size of the electricity market33.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 All figures were adjusted to 2007 prices and are expressed in US$.  
33 For instance, following Domah and Pollitt (2001) and Mota (2003); the average annual distributed units 
are 279 TWh and 187 TWh, regarding the electricity market in England and Wales (actual figures: from 
1990 to 1997, projected figures from 1998 to 2005) and Brazil (actual figures: from 1995 to 2000, projected 
figures from 2001 to 2007) respectively. In the case of Peru the average annual distributed units are around 
12.58 TWh (actual figures: from 1995 to 2007, projected figures: from 2008 to 2022). 
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Table 4: Net Gains from Restructuring and Privatisation of Electricity Distribution Markets  
A comparative analysis 
 
Cost fall rate = 2 per cent
5% 6% 8% 10% 12%
Domah, P. and Pollitt, M.G. (2001)
Electricity Market: England and Wales
Gains (US$ billion, 2007 prices) 26.08 19.70 12.76 8.88 6.10
Gains as % of costs 20.2% 18.3% 15.8% 13.7% 11.3%
Gains per KWh (US$ cents/ KWh, 2007 prices) 0.55 0.50 0.43 0.38 0.31
Mota, R.  (2003)
Electricity Market: Brazil
Gains (US$ billion, 2007 prices) 13.39 11.86
Gains as % of costs 21.2% 26.2%
Gains per KWh (US$ cents/ KWh, 2007 prices) 0.94 1.00
This paper 
Electricity Market: Peru 
Gains (US$ billion, 2007 prices) 0.36 0.32 0.26 0.20 0.16
Gains as % of costs 12.9% 13.7% 14.4% 14.4% 13.9%
Gains per KWh (US$ cents/ KWh, 2007 prices) 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.33
Discount rate 
 
 
In terms of gains as percentage of costs34, Brazil has the highest percentage and 
England and Wales along with Peru have similar percentages (discount rates 
from 8 per cent to 12 per cent) One reason that could explain this fact is that in 
the Brazilian market net efficiency gains started accruing immediately (from 
1995) in comparison with the English and Peruvian market, which began 
accruing after some years (from the base year, 1990 and 1995 respectively).  
Gains per KWh35 are also in line with the previous results, being Brazil the 
market with the highest figures.  
 
The next section explains in detail the selection of the counterfactual cost decline 
for the central-case scenario (up date and the future) and section 5.3 discusses 
the distributional gains.     
 
5.2 Gains based on the central-case scenario  
 
In order to select the counterfactual cost fall for the central-case scenario the 
trend of public companies was analysed. The target companies were those that 
operate in areas with high population density36. The companies selected were 
Electro Norte Medio (a company that was sold but then returned to public 
                                                 
34 The gains as percentage of costs indicate the average annual gains as a percentage of operating 
controllable costs. The procedure for computing this is as follows: the total gains are multiplied by the 
respective discount rate, and then this value is divided by the actual operating controllable costs (base 
year). The exercise is repeated for each set of discount rates. 
35 The procedure for computing this variable is very similar to the previous one. Net gains are multiplied by 
the discount rate and then divided by the number of distributed units related to the base year.  
36 Electrolima operated in Lima, where the population density is high. Electro Norte Medio and Seal operate 
in Trujillo and Arequipa respectively, two of the most important cities in Peru with important population 
density as well.  
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ownership) and Seal (a company that was always under public ownership) 37. 
The results show that the annual average cost fall is approximately 2.4 per cent 
for Seal and 4.3 per cent for Electro Norte Medio38. Thus, a counterfactual cost 
fall of 2.4 per cent was taken for the central-case39. The counterfactual cost fall of 
4.3 per cent was not taken into account because this rate may be capturing the 
effect of having been privatised for some years.  
  
Table 5 shows the benefits regarding the central-case scenario at different 
discount rates for the period today (from privatisation to 2007) and the future 
(from privatisation to 2022). A 7.3 per cent discount rate is selected for the 
analysis. The selection of the period for computing this rate (1990’s) is in line 
with our base year.  
 
Table 5: Net efficiency gains for central-case scenario 
 
Central case scenario (2.4%)
2007 prices (US$ million) 5% 6% 7.3% 8% 10% 12% 5% 6% 7.3% 8% 10% 12%
Electrolima 183.5 166.1 146.0 136.2 111.7 91.4 289.1 255.5 218.2 200.7 158.6 125.9
Electro Sur Medio 6.3 5.9 5.5 5.3 4.7 4.3 11.2 10.2 9.0 8.4 7.1 6.1
Efficiency gains 189.7 172.0 151.5 141.5 116.4 95.7 300.3 265.6 227.2 209.1 165.7 132.0
Efficiency gains (% cost) 6.7% 7.3% 7.8% 8.0% 8.2% 8.1% 10.6% 11.2% 11.7% 11.8% 11.7% 11.2%
Net efficiency gains 174.5 157.5 137.8 128.2 104.3 84.6 285.0 251.1 213.5 195.8 153.6 120.8
Up to 2007 Up to 2022
Discount rate
 
 
 
From Table 5 we observe that total net efficiency gains (including future gains) 
are equal to US$ 213.5 million in real terms and that gains amounts to US$ 137.8 
if the period of analysis is limited to 2007. In both cases, the gains explained by 
the controllable cost reduction relative to Electrolima are much higher than 
those from Electro Sur Medio. Electrolima accounts for 96 per cent of the net 
gains (including future gains) and Electro Sur Medio for the remaining 4 per cent. 
These results are very dependant on the selected discount rate due to the 
skewness of the distribution cost and benefits. A 5 per cent discount rate 
produces an increase of 34 per cent in the net efficiency gains while a 12 per cent 
discount rate produces a decrease of 43 per cent.  
 
It is important to remark that gains are also sensitive to the size of the market. 
Results from Domah and Pollitt (2001) for the UK electricity market and Mota 
(2003) for the Brazilian electricity market, show much higher efficiency gains 
than our results, under similar conditions40. Total delivered units previous to 
                                                 
37 An additional characteristic is that generation electricity is almost negligible in both cases (similar to 
Electro Sur Medio). This fact facilitated the calculation of the unit controllable operating costs 
38 The analysis was made for the period 1994-2007.  
39 This result is also in line with the counterfactual cost decline selected in different studies that involved 
developed and developing countries. Domah and Pollitt (2001), Mota (2003) selected a 2 per cent 
counterfactual cost decline for the central-case scenario. Thus, we believe that a selection of a counterfactual 
cost fall of 2.4 per cent is quite acceptable.   
40 In terms of discount rates and counterfactual cost falls.  
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privatisation were about 250 TWh and 135 TWh respectively, in comparison 
with 5.3 TWh regarding the Peruvian market. 
 
5.3 The distribution of gains based on the central-case scenario 
 
A distributional analysis will tell us about the winners and losers due to 
restructuring and privatisation. In this section and the next one the analysis will 
include future gains. Table 6 shows the net distributional gains for the central-
case scenario when λg=λc=λp=1.Government and producers benefit at the six 
discount rates of our analysis. Consumers suffer at any discount rates. This fact 
can be explained by the increase in tariffs after the following years of 
privatisation.  
 
In addition, it is perceived that the distributional gains between the two 
companies are different. For the central-case scenario at 7.3 per cent discount 
rate regarding Electrolima, producers have the highest gains equal to US$ 329.3 
million. In the case of Electro Sur, government accounts for the highest benefits 
equal to US$ 8.7 million.    
 
Table 6: Distribution of the net efficiency gains from restructuring and privatisation 
Central-case scenario 
 
Central-case scenario (2.4% cost fall) 
2007 prices (US$ million)  
Net Distributional Gains 5% 6% 7.3% 8% 10% 12%
1. Electrolima
ΔGov 320.9 291.9 259.7 244.5 207.9 179.1
ΔCon -482.6 -435.4 -384.3 -360.6 -304.9 -262.6
ΔProd 435.6 384.6 329.3 303.7 243.6 198.3
ΔW 274.0 241.1 204.7 187.6 146.6 114.9
2. Electro Sur Medio
ΔGov 10.7 9.8 8.7 8.2 6.9 5.9
ΔCon -8.1 -6.7 -5.3 -4.6 -3.0 -1.8
ΔProd 8.4 7.0 5.4 4.7 3.1 1.9
ΔW 11.0 10.0 8.8 8.3 7.0 6.0
Total net distributional gains
ΔGov 331.7 301.7 268.3 252.6 214.8 185.0
ΔCon -490.7 -442.2 -389.5 -365.2 -307.9 -264.4
ΔProd 444.0 391.6 334.7 308.4 246.7 200.2
ΔW 285.0 251.1 213.5 195.8 153.6 120.8
Discount rate
 
 
Figure 2 depicts the annual trend of the distribution net efficiency gains 
regarding both companies after privatisation and for the central-case scenario. 
Government benefits from the beginning, fact that is explained by the collection 
of taxes. The fall observed between 1997 and 1998 is explained by the 
assumption that state-owned companies start to pay taxes since 1998. Producers 
benefit continuously since 1997. Based on the assumptions made (efficiency gap 
will be closed and prices will be the same under private and public ownership in 
15 years time), for the period 2008-2022 government and producers’ gains 
decrease continuously and customers’ gains increases. Consumers are the most 
affected by assumption. The fall in the distribution of benefits to consumers is in 
agreement with the increase in price after privatisation. See next section for 
further details.  
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Figure 2: Distribution of net efficiency gains 
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The use of different social weights increases significantly these gains. There is 
not a definitive agreement about the most appropriate value for λg, λp and λc. 
Galal et al. (1994) state that different weights may be required when an economy 
is highly distorted. Domah and Pollitt (2001) agree with that statement and 
assume λg = λp = 1 in the case of a developed economy.  Jones et al. (1990) find 
prudent to assume that λg>λp from the taxation perspective, otherwise it would 
imply that government would minimize the sale price. In addition, they agree 
that λg > λc in the case of developing economies. Mota (2003) assumes λg> λp, 
and sets two different values to λp and λc (0.8, 0.5) for analysing the social 
benefits in restructuring and privatising the Brasilian electricity distribution 
companies. Thus, the selection of the most appropriate value for each social 
weight involves a specific country analysis which is beyond the extent of this 
empirical study. Therefore, taking into consideration that Brazil and Peru are 
both developing economies, it is considered properly to assume that λg=1, λp=0.5 
and that λc can take two values, 0.8 or 0.5. The results of introducing different 
social weights are discussed in Section 5.5.  
 
5.4 Impact on Prices  
 
Based on the estimations made for the period 1994-2022, prices under private 
ownership would be in average 8.6 per cent higher than those under public 
ownership41. Figure 3 illustrates the trend of actual, counterfactual and projected 
prices for the central-case scenario. The gap between actual and counterfactual 
prices regarding the first years after privatisation is noticeable. This trend is also 
in line with the evolution of nationwide real residential prices, which increased 
around 20 per cent from 01/94 to 12/9642. For the period 2001 to 2003 the gap 
between both prices is much lower and in 2004 counterfactual prices are higher 
                                                 
41 Prices were obtained dividing net revenues by the total distributed units. Then, the price difference 
between the actual and counterfactual scenario per year was calculated. The difference was expressed in 
percentage. Finally, the average of this difference was computed for the period 1994-2022. This value is the 
average variation in prices equal to 8.6 per cent 
42 The trend of nationwide residential prices (tariff BT5) for the period 1994-2007 was analysed.  
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than actual prices. After 2004, a rise in actual prices is noticed and then a 
downturn is visualized. Based on our assumptions, in 2022 the gap between 
counterfactual and actual prices will be closed.   
 
Figure 3: Actual, counterfactual and projected prices for central-case scenario 
(Net revenues per KWh) 
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The trend changes in actual prices are also in agreement with the last three 
prices review regarding the distribution valued added (VAD). Prices were 
adjusted in 11/1997, 11/2001 and 11/2005, respectively43. It is important to 
note that even though the VAD represents an important component of the end 
user tariff44 and is adjusted each four years; the end user price is also composed 
of “transmission prices” and “generation prices”, with annual adjustments. 
 
These results are in line with the trend in tariffs in some developing countries 
after the reform of the electricity sector. The true levels of price distortion are 
exposed during the first years of reform (Sen and Jamasb, 2010). In Latin 
American and Asian developing countries, electricity residential prices tended to 
increase when the regulatory agency was established, however, in developed 
countries the effect was inverse (Nagayama, 2007)45. Haselip et al. (2005) explain 
a different trend on prices after market liberalisation in Argentina. Price 
reductions are remarkable but the benefits have been disproportional; 
residential and industrial consumers with highest level of consumptions 
benefited the most (71 per cent and 44 per cent of reductions respectively). 
Prices for residential low-income remain nearly the same. In summary, increase 
in electricity prices could difficult the access to the service to low-income users, 
but at the same time cost-reflective tariffs (usually higher after deregulation in 
developing countries) could provide incentives to companies for expanding the 
service and for improving the quality of this. The subsidy schemes applied by 
                                                 
43 The most recent price control was in 11/2009. Taking into consideration that actual prices were 
computed for the period 1994-2007, the effect of the last price control was not captured in this figure.  
44 The distribution prices represent around 30 per cent of the end user bill (residential customers).  
45 An econometric model was built for analysing the effect that the establishment of independent regulator, 
unbundling, retail competition, among others; have in the trend of real residential prices. The establishment 
of independent regulator was statistically significant at 0.05 level. In terms of the trend of real industrial 
prices, the coefficient is also positive but not significant.  
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some developing countries tend to increase the electricity access rate in low-
income users from urban and rural areas. It is important to find a balance that 
allows passing companies’ gains to customers. Lower prices could tend to an 
inefficient use of electricity and higher prices could inhibit users from the service 
and look for alternative sources that could harm the environment such as wood 
fuels (Goldemberg et al., 2004).  
 
In this section the actual and counterfactual prices trend has been examined. The 
price control formula put in place at privatisation contributed to the increase in 
prices, specifically after the first years of privatisation. However, are these 
trends, in line with those changes in operating controllable costs? When 
analyzing the trend of unit operating controllable costs, an important decrease is 
noticed for the period 1997- 2001 and a smoothed decline for the period 2002- 
2007.  However, from Figure 3 prices remain almost the same for the period 
1997-2001, even though unit controllable costs decrease notably. For the period 
2002-2004, the price reduction is in agreement with the decrease in unit 
operating controllable costs. Therefore, the gap between cost and prices tends to 
be much wider during the first years after privatisation. This fact is also 
expected. Taking into account the initial conditions under which the state-owned 
companies operated before privatisation, the application of cost reduction 
policies by the new administration (privatised company) tends to be more 
noticeable during the first years of operation. This is also supported by the fact 
that companies want to recover their investment in as short a time as possible 
after the acquisition.  
 
5.5 Additional Benefits and the impact of different social weights  
 
In 1993 the nationwide coverage was 57 per cent and at the end of 2007 around 
80 per cent of the population had electricity. The companies derived from the 
state-owned company Electrolima; Edelnor and Luz del Sur, which accounted for 
61.3 per cent of the total electricity sold in 2007, have achieved almost the 100 
per cent of their respective concession areas. However, electrification 
achievements cannot be uniquely attribute to privatisation. The electricity sector 
reform, that includes the restructuring of the sector, the application of prices that 
reflect the real cost, the incentives that government provide to expand the 
electricity coverage in remote areas and to low-income users, among others; 
allowed to privatised companies to expand their services. Government through 
the Executive Office for Projects – DEP has played an important role. The DEP is 
managed by MINEM and it is in charge of planning, designing and implementing 
rural electricity projects. After their implementation the operation and 
maintenance is transferred to distribution companies, local governments or to 
ADINELSA46. Despite its effort47, rural electricity coverage increased from 7.7 per 
cent in 1993 to 30 per cent in 200748. The peculiar geography (in mountains and 
                                                 
46 ADINELSA is a state-owned company in charge of developing rural electrification projects in areas that 
are outside the concession area of distribution companies.  
47 The Peruvian Government has spent around US$ 50 million p.a. in the last 10 years for rural 
electrification. There is a commitment to increase this coverage from 30 per cent to 75 per cent by 2013. 
(World Bank, 2006) 
48 MINEM (2008) 
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jungle) and the high level of dispersion of rural villages makes the task more 
difficult.  
 
Edelnor, along with Ede Cañete and Electro Sur Medio are the companies that 
have contributed more to the expansion of the electricity service to the poorest 
population into their concession areas. Edelnor operates in sectors 1, 2, 3 and 5, 
Ede Cañete in sectors 2 and 4, while Electro Sur Medio in sectors 2, 3, 4 and 549. 
In addition, this statement is also in line with the fact that 83 per cent of Edelnor’ 
customers belong to the poorer segments of Lima population. (Alcazar et al., 
2007). At the same time the strategy opted by the government in the sale of 
regional electricity companies (Electro Sur Medio); in which 50 per cent of the 
offer price would be used for future investments in isolated villages, resulting in 
the implementation of electrification projects that contributed to the expansion 
of the electricity frontier in remote areas. 
 
In terms of benefits of being connected, Alcazar et al. (2007) explains that access 
to electricity in rural areas produces an improvement in household’s welfare due 
to a substitution effect explained by a decline of hours spent in farm activities 
and an increase in hours spent on leisure. The World Bank (2008) calculated that 
rural electrification benefits are approximately US$ 30.5 per household per 
month in Peru50. Therefore, we find reasonable to add the benefits of being 
connected to the total gains regarding the restructuring and privatisation of 
Electrolima and Electro Sur Medio. For this purpose, a counterfactual scenario 
was also built for the period 1995-2022. This scenario was built in two stages: 
one for the period 1995-2001 and the other one for the period 2002-2022. For 
the first stage it was assumed that the annual growth rate is similar to that from 
Seal (5.4 per cent); the state-owned distribution company whose trend in annual 
average cost fall was taken into consideration for the construction of the central-
case scenario in section 5.2. For the second period, it was assumed that the gap in 
household connections under the public and private ownership will be closed in 
2022. In terms of actual household connections it was assumed that these grow 
at 3.12 per cent p.a. for the period 2008-2022, which is the average annual 
growth rate of households in the companies’ concession areas for the period 
1995-2007. Figure 4 illustrates the actual and counterfactual household 
connections. During the following 5 years after privatisation the actual 
household connections increased notably at 6 per cent p.a. (this explains the 
significant gap observed between 1995 and 2000). This value is twice the annual 
growth rate of households placed in the companies’ concession areas. The value 
determined by the World Bank is taken as reference for estimating the benefits 
of being connected. The GDP index was used for adjusting this value51 and it was 
                                                 
49 Distribution electricity companies can operate in more than one sector. At the moment there are six 
sectors, from sector 1 (high population density-urban) to sector 5 (low population density-rural), and sector 
6 which refers to pre paid systems. 
50 From which U$ 16.16 accounts for benefits in lighting, US$ 8.5 for benefits in TV, US$ 5.5 for time saved 
for household chores/increasing leisure, US$ 0.02 for improving health, US$ 0.08 for reducing fertility and 
US$ 0.24 for reducing pollution. The Bank has estimated the valuation of the benefits of lighting and TV 
based on Willingness to Pay (WTP), which was calculated taking in consideration the cost of the existing 
source (kerosene lamp). Customer Price Index and GDP index were used for adjusting this value.   
51 Actual GDP per capita was obtained from World Bank database. Projected GDP per capita was obtained 
from International Monetary Fund database.  
 23
assumed that benefits are constant in real values for the whole period of the 
analysis.  
Figure 4: Number of household connections (actual and counterfactual) 
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 The difference between the actual and the counterfactual household connections 
is multiplied by the net benefit52 of being connected per household. This product 
represents the total benefits per year. Then, all the values are aggregated on a 
present value basis using the same set of discount rates assumed in section 3.4.   
Table 7 summarizes the total social welfare for restructuring and privatisation Electrolima and 
Electro Sur Medio under three scenarios (1) λg=λc=λp, (2) λg>λc=λp and (3) λg>λc>λp.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52Net benefits are equal to benefits net of connection cost. Following Horn (2007), the average cost of a new 
connection in rural areas amounts to US$ 1,200 and it is assumed that it remains constant for the whole 
period. To compute the annual cost, this value was divided by the connection lifetime, equal to 30 years. The 
IPM was used for adjusting this value. 
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Table 7: Social welfare from restructuring and privatisation under different values of social weight – 
Consolidation of results 
 
5% 6% 7.3% 8% 10% 12%
Base Scenario ( λg =  λc =  λp = 1)
ΔGov 331.7 301.7 268.3 252.6 214.8 185.0
ΔCon -490.7 -442.2 -389.5 -365.2 -307.9 -264.4
ΔProd 444.0 391.6 334.7 308.4 246.7 200.2
Social welfare 285.0 251.1 213.5 195.8 153.6 120.8
Including additional benefits 
ΔCon -156.0 -109.7 -61.3 -39.8 8.1 40.7
Social welfare 619.6 583.5 541.7 521.3 469.5 426.0
Scenario 1 ( λg = 1, λc = λp = 0.5)
ΔGov 331.7 301.7 268.3 252.6 214.8 185.0
ΔCon -245.3 -221.1 -194.8 -182.6 -153.9 -132.2
ΔProd 222.0 195.8 167.3 154.2 123.3 100.1
Social welfare 820.6 788.6 753.1 736.5 696.4 665.2
Including additional benefits 
ΔCon 89.3 111.4 133.5 142.8 162.0 172.9
Social welfare 1,155.2 1,121.1 1,081.4 1,061.9 1,012.3 970.3
Scenario 2 ( λg = 1, λc = 0.8, λp = 0.5)
ΔGov 331.7 301.7 268.3 252.6 214.8 185.0
ΔCon -392.5 -353.7 -311.6 -292.1 -246.3 -211.5
ΔProd 222.0 195.8 167.3 154.2 123.3 100.1
Social welfare 673.4 655.9 636.3 626.9 604.0 585.8
Including additional benefits 
ΔCon -57.9 -21.3 16.6 33.3 69.6 93.6
Social welfare 1,008.0 988.4 964.5 952.3 920.0 891.0
Social benefits from being connected 334.6 332.5 328.2 325.4 315.9 305.1
Social welfare includes the sales component (scenario 1 and 2)
Central-case scenario (2.4% cost fall) 2007 
prices (US$ million)  
Discount rate
 
 
Taking into account that it is the poor who are being connected, this assumption 
makes sense. Customer social welfare weight should be at least equal or greater 
than the producer one. Benefits to consumers of being connected have also been 
included in Table 7.  
 
The large size of the price of the executed sale53 in comparison with the non 
weighed efficiency gains, explains the increase in efficiency gains when using 
different social shadow multipliers. At a discount rate of 7.3 per cent, benefits 
accounted for the sale prices represent 68 per cent and 81 per cent of social 
welfare54, when λc=0.5 and λc=0.8, respectively. When λc=0.8 social welfare 
increases by 198 per cent in comparison with the non weighted gains. The rise is 
more impressive when λc=0.5, social welfare jumps from US$ 213.5 to US$ 753.1 
million. The individual analysis (per company) shows a similar trend in gains 
variation for both companies.  
 
For the central-case and base scenario the social welfare moves from US$ 213.5 
to US$ 541.7 million when the additional benefits are included. The application 
of different social weights increases the social welfare, in which the value of the 
sales still has an important participation. Social welfare ranges between US$ 
541.7 and US$ 1,081.4 million when additional benefits are included. The 
                                                 
53 Sales amount to US$ 1.02 billion in 2007 prices. 
54 Without including benefits of being connected.  
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distributional gains are affected as well; due to the new distributional gains for 
customers (government and producers’ gains remain the same). Even though the 
inclusion of additional benefits for customers, they still suffer. Under scenario 1 
and 2, consumers’ gains improves and amounts to US$ 133.5 million and US$ 
16.5 million respectively; however this quantity only represents 12 per cent and 
2 per cent of the total social welfare under scenario 1 and 2.  
 
5.6 Quality Issues  
 
It is expected that quality and performance improve after privatisation. In order 
to compute an integrated social benefit analysis, the inclusion of quality 
parameters would make the task more difficult due to the need to (1) measure 
and value quality and (2) identify a counterfactual that simulates the quality 
dimension. In this sense, the discussion is limited to analyse briefly the evolution 
of quality indicators such as number and duration of interruptions per customer 
(SAIFI and SAIDI respectively)55 and distribution losses. For a better 
understanding of the evolution of these indicators, the trend of benchmark 
companies was examined56. SAIFI and SAIDI indicators dropped markedly during 
the first years after privatisation. A nationwide decrease of 64.4 per cent and 
58.2 percent in SAIDI and SAIFI indicators respectively is observed for the period 
1995-2001 (World Bank, 2005). The improvements are more noticeable in the 
biggest companies that operate in areas with high density, mainly in sector 1 and 
2. For instance, SAIFI and SAIDI indicators from Edelnor have significantly 
decreased by 75.1 per cent and 77.2 per cent respectively for the period 1995-
2001.  However after several years of privatisation, period 2002-200757, there is 
no notable trend due to a possible stabilisation of the indicators in special for the 
biggest companies such as Luz del Sur and Edelnor. See Figure 5.  
 
                                                 
55 Interruptions that are equal or greater than three minutes.  
56 The companies were grouped as follows: (1) privatised companies – type 1, (2) companies that were 
privatised but returned to public hands – type 2, (3) companies that were included in the privatisation 
process but were not sold – type 3, and (4) companies that were not included in the privatisation process 
and are still under public ownership– type 4. An additional kind of companies is composed of private 
companies and those companies that are managed by local governments, however due to the relative small 
size in comparison with the privatised companies; these were excluded from the analysis.  
57 Data from this period refers to N and D (number and duration of interruption per customer) defined by 
the Quality Technical Normative for the provision of Electricity – NTCSE. Due to the absence of data from all 
the companies regarding SAIFI and SAIDI (before 2005) and the similarity of their calculation with N and D 
indicators, the last ones were used as reference.  
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Figure 5: Evolution of the Number and Duration of Interruptions 
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Smaller companies, such as Electro Sur Medio and Ede Cañete, do not show a 
downward tendency even after seven years of being privatised. Customers from 
these companies that live in lower sectors are the most affected in terms of 
quality issues and it seems to be that privatisation did not produce any 
significant change for them. The high level of dispersion and adverse 
geographical conditions in lower sectors could explain this. The time to repair 
any faults in the network would be much higher.  
 
For instance, in the second semester of 2007 the average number of 
interruptions per customer/semester58 for sector 1 and sector 5 was 2.82 and 
20.53 in the same order and the average duration of interruption per customer 
was 5.32 and 48.51 respectively. Thus, there is an important difference in quality 
indicators among sectors and these indicators depend strongly on the area in 
which companies operate. The application of penalties for breaching the 
maximum values allowed, helped to reduce these indicators59 even though the 
level of  improvements have not been the same among companies.  
 
The reduction of distribution losses60 after privatisation is significant. For Type 1 
companies, losses reduced in average from 17 per cent in 1994 to 7.5 per cent in 
2007. The most important reduction was during the three years after the sale of 
the companies: Electrolima (1995 – 1998) and Electro Sur Medio (1998 – 2001); 
distribution losses decreased by 7.5 and 6.0 percentage points respectively. Type 
2 companies followed the same direction with the difference that the decrease 
started two years before the sale of this group of companies and are on average 
higher by two percentage points than those from type 1 companies. One of the 
factors influencing this behaviour is the process of restructuring that companies 
experienced prior to their sale. The fact that these companies returned to the 
government at the end of 2001, did not affect negatively the trend in distribution 
losses which was approximately 9.4 per cent at the end of 2007. For type 3 
companies, the average distribution loss (10.3 per cent) did not differ significant 
from type 2 companies. The higher level of dispersion in which type 3 companies 
operate would explain this difference. The last category, type 4 companies has 
the highest distribution losses, 15.8 per cent at the end of 2007. One reason is 
that these companies are state-owned companies that never were included in the 
privatisation pack and therefore were never restructured for a future sale. See 
Figure 6.  
 
One of the main explanations of these important reductions among companies is 
supported by the incentives that government provided to them (private and 
state-owned companies) though the recognition of supplementary distribution 
losses from 1993 to 200561. These losses were added to those already recognized 
in the efficiency company model for computing their respective tariffs. The trend 
                                                 
58 Includes all the public and private distribution electricity companies.  
59 For fine purposes, these indicators are multiplied by specific factors depending on the type of 
interruption. These factors vary from 0.25 to 1. Penalties are applied when these new values exceed the 
maximum allowed.  
60 The losses include technical and non-technical losses. A disaggregation was not possible due to the non-
availability of this information.  
61 These supplementary losses decreased gradually during this period. In average, they moved from 9 per 
cent in 1993 to 0.8 per cent in 2005. From 2006 onwards these losses were not recognized in the tariff.  
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of these reductions is also in line with that from other South American countries 
such as Argentina (Pollit, 2008; Haselip et al., 2005), Colombia (Larsen et al., 
2004; Arango et al., 2006), Chile (Fisher et al., 2003; Pollitt, 2004). A different 
approach is that from Sen and Tooraj (2010) who determine that transmission 
and distribution losses increased after deregulation of the electricity sector in 
India. They argue that inefficiencies tend to be exposed after deregulation. 
Political and institutional endowments in developing countries have a strong 
influence in the deregulation outcome (Newbery, 2001).   
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Figure 6: Evolution of electricity distribution losses
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Unlike electricity coverage and quality issues (such as SAIFI and SAIDI), a 
reduction in distribution losses implies greater benefits for the electricity 
companies than for customers. As a consequence revenues would increase, due 
to this reduction. Revenues (net revenues62) for type 1 companies were analysed 
for the years following their privatisations and it was observed the average 
annual growth rate was higher for those years. Edelnor, Luz del Sur and Ede 
Cañete presented an average rate of 5.7 per cent for the period 1995-1998 and 
3.2 per cent for the period 1999 – 2007.  The average rate for Electro Sur Medio 
was approximately 13 per cent for the period 1998 - 2001 and 3 per cent for the 
period 2002-2007.  
 
From the perspective of distribution losses and irrespective of who were the 
main beneficiaries due to this reduction, it is clear that losses are much lower 
after the sector reform. From the analysis we observe that independently of the 
form of ownership companies have reported important achievements. Previous 
studies conclude that privatisation is not the major determinant from improving 
efficiency (Pollitt, 1997). Privatisation alone without the restructuring of the 
sector and a proper regulatory framework would not have produced these 
improvements. Incentive regulation has a positive impact on operative efficiency. 
This is also in line with Newbery, 2002, who states that efficiency depends more 
on the form of regulation that on the form of ownership. Jamasb (2006) points 
out that distribution companies in developing countries have strong potential to 
transfer gains to customers when incentive regulation is applied. Zheng et al. 
(2006) who analyse the impact of the electricity reform in developing countries 
conclude that in the absence of competition, the benefits from privatisation in 
terms of performance improvements are captured with the implementation of 
effective regulation.   
 
Even though there is empirical evidence that revenues increased during the 
years following their privatisations, reduction in losses could be just one of the 
factors that contributed to this phenomenon. Other factors may include tariff 
increase, electricity coverage expansion, tax benefits and improvements in the 
collection of commercial debts. Regarding to the first, as we have discussed 
before, the price control formula put in place at privatisation allowed price 
sincerity, as a consequence tariffs increased notably. In terms of electricity 
coverage, companies had enough incentives to expand their networks. The 
transfer of rural projects from government to distribution companies for their 
operation and maintenance, the implementation of social tariff scheme63 and the 
permission that electricity companies had to ask for a reimbursed funding to the 
population that would be served through the expansion of the electricity service; 
are among these incentives64. In relation to the taxes, companies were subject to 
                                                 
62 Net revenues exclude purchase of energy and generation and transmission costs.  
63 In 2001 was established the Social Electricity Compensation Fund (FOSE) by Law 27510. This fund 
allowed fixed and gradually discounts to customers with monthly consumptions lower than 100kWh. FOSE 
is funding by regulated customers with consumptions higher than 100kWh. The main beneficiaries are low-
income population from urban and rural areas, including those connected with isolated systems.   
64 During the first years of privatisation 590 projects that amounted to US$ 105 million were implemented 
by this method. Congreso (2002).  
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tax benefits from 1994 to 199865. Tax benefits allowed companies to revalue 
their fixed assets in favour of these. As a result, companies reported lower 
operating profits before taxes and by default net revenues increased. Regarding 
the last concept, the trend of the biggest and smallest companies was analysed. 
For this purpose, an indicator was constructed which allows us to measure the 
annual average commercial’ debts in months66. An impressive improvement is 
observed during the first years after privatisation related to Edelnor and Luz del 
Sur. Customers debts decreased by 26.8 per cent, which means the annual 
average debts moved from 2.7 to 1.9 months for the period 1996-2000. After this 
period, the indicator does not report important changes. In terms of the smallest 
companies, Ede Cañete and Electro Sur Medio, an apposite trend is observed. 
During the first years of privatisation the variation is small and the annual 
average indicator is 2.8 months. From 2003 to 2007 an important decline is 
perceived; the indicator decreased at 3 per cent p.a. and was around 1.8 months 
in 2007, similar to the biggest ones. Thus, debt indicators have improved in the 
biggest and the smallest private companies. This improvement, specifically to the 
biggest companies, could contribute in some extent to the remarkable increase in 
revenues after the first years of privatisation. The better collection of bills is also 
an expected output after reform. An important fact that contributed with this 
trend was the formality of illegal connections and metering. In Colombia, during 
the first years after deregulation, the collection of bills improved by nearly 60 
per cent, it moved from 2.72 months (1996) to 1.1 months (1999), (Larsen et al., 
2004). Other reforms with positive outcomes in bill collection are Argentina and 
Chile, (Pollitt, 2008; Pollitt, 2004).   
 
 6. Conclusions   
 
The partial privatisation and restructuring of the electricity distribution market 
was worthwhile and amounts to US$ 542 million in 2007 prices, relative to the 
central-case scenario at 7.3 per cent discount rate. The benefits of improving 
quality issues, namely the expansion of the electricity coverage contribute to 
these gains and represent around 61 per cent of the net gains. The highest 
benefits of being connected are obtained during the first five years after 
privatisation. During the period 1995-1999 the number of household 
connections increased at 6 per cent p.a., which is twice the annual growth rate of 
households placed in the companies’ concession areas. The incentives that 
companies received for expanding their networks in the lower-income 
population areas could explain this expansion.  
 
Results from the distributional gains show that government and producers 
benefit the most and consumers benefit the least. It is only with the introduction 
of the benefits of being connected that consumers start to gain. Customers suffer 
due to price increase. This fact was expected after the application of the 
improved price calculation methodology which allowed “price sincerity”. Actual 
                                                 
65 Approved by Law No 26283, 10/01/1994 and its directive by Supreme Decree No 120-94-EF, 
19/09/1994.  
66 The procedure is as follows: (1) the annual net commercial’ debts are divided by the total energy billed, 
(2) this value is multiply by 12 in order to obtain the average consumer’s debt. The net commercial’ debts 
are found in the companies’ balance sheet.  Commercial debt refers to the customers’ debts.  
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average price p.a. is higher than the preferred counterfactual in 8.6 per cent, for 
the period 1994-2022. The application of cost reflective prices provided enough 
incentives to companies for improving the quality of services and for expanding 
the electricity coverage. The application of social tariffs (FOSE) has helped in 
some extent to alleviate the impact of price increases on low-income customers.  
 
The increase of net revenues relate to the privatised companies during the first 
years after being privatised, is noticeable. The price increase, tax benefits, service 
expansion and the better collection of revenues (bills) are among the main issues 
that could contribute with this. Operating controllable costs follow an opposite 
trend. Bearing in mind the initial conditions under which the state-owned 
companies operated before privatisation, privatised companies tended to apply 
effective cost reduction measurements which results were more noticeable 
during the first years of operation.  
 
Incentive regulation has contributed notably to the positive trend in quality 
issues. Improvements in quality indicators such as number and time of 
interruptions are more evident in companies (privatised and state-owned) that 
operate in areas with higher population density. Smaller privatised companies 
do not show a downward tendency even after seven years of being privatised. 
The sectors in which the electricity companies operate have a strong influence 
on these indicators, independently of whether the companies are under private 
or public-ownership. In terms of distribution losses, Edelnor and Luz del Sur 
have the lowest distribution losses and smaller privatised companies, such as 
Ede Cañete and Electro Sur Medio, show a less impressive but significant 
reduction of distribution losses after their sale. Important improvements were 
also observed in state-owned companies.   
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 Appendix 1: Adjustments  
 
a. Generation and Transmission Costs 
 
Because of the lack of historical data related to both costs, for the period 1986-
1993, some approximations were made. Regarding Electrolima, the calculations 
for generation costs were based following the diagnostic performed by 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Andean Bank for CEPREL. They 
calculated the generation costs for the years 1991 and 1992. These costs did not 
include depreciation and taxes (fixed costs) but included fuel costs (variable 
costs). In order to approximate the generation costs for the pending years, an 
additional study elaborated by Coopers & Lybrand for CEPREL as well, was also 
examined. In this study a cost disaggregation per activity (generation, 
transmission, distribution, commercialization and administration) was 
performed for the year 1992.  Taking into consideration the proportional cost 
allocation per item (such as depreciation, taxes, labour expenses, others), a cost 
disaggregation for the period 1986 – 1990 was constructed. In order to analyse 
the robustness of this approximation, a comparison in fixed generation costs 
(excluding depreciation and taxes) was made with those calculated by IFC and 
the Andean Bank for 1992 and 1991 in real values. As a result, an average 
difference of 3.7 per cent was found. We use this difference in order to adjust the 
rest of the calculations (from 1986 to 1990) related to the fixed generation costs. 
Thus to obtain the total generation costs per year (equal to fixed cost plus 
variable costs) the fuel cost were added. The transmission costs were obtained 
using the respective proportional cost allocated to the transmission activity by 
Coopers & Lybrand. Both, the approximations for generation and transmission 
costs were net of depreciation and taxes.  
 
Regarding Electro Sur Medio, the generation of electricity was not too significant 
in comparison with the purchase of energy, it just accounted for 5 per cent of the 
total electricity to be distributed in 1986 and for less than 0.2 per cent at the end 
of 2007. Due to the lack of information regarding generation costs for the period 
1986-199367, the average generation costs for the period 1994 – 1996 was taken 
as a reference for calculating the generation costs for the pending years. It was 
assumed that these costs would remain the same in real values. Electro Sur 
Medio did not report any incurred expenses in transmission68.  
 
b. Generation and Transmission Assets  
 
In the case of Electrolima, generation assets are equal to those assets that were 
transferred to Edegel (the generation company created after the unbundling of 
Electrolima) in 1993. In the same way, transmission assets are equal to those 
assets that were transferred to the transmission company Empresa de 
Transmisión Eléctrica Centro Norte (a transmission company that was created in 
order to assume the transmission activities of Electrolima and Electroperu) in 
                                                 
67 The submission of the cost breakdown per generation, transmission and distribution activities has been 
compulsory since 1994. For the period 1994- 2007, the company reported cero expenses in transmission.  
68 For the period 1994- 2007, the company reported cero expenses in transmission. 
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1993. It was assumed that both values would remain the same (fixed values) in 
real terms for the period 1986-1992. For Electro Sur Medio, generation assets 
were obtained from Electro Sur Medio Libro Blanco69. This information is 
available only for 1995, thus it was also assumed that generation assets will 
remain the same in real terms for the period 1986-1996. The exclusion of 
generation and transmission assets was necessary in order to calculate the rate 
of return on assets regarding only the distribution activity. The average rate of 
return for the periods 1991-1993 (Electrolima) and 1994-1996 (Electro Sur 
Medio) was used for computing the operating profits under the counterfactual 
scenario for both companies, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 The Libro Blanco contains a document that was prepared by the company Agua y Energía Ingenieros 
Consultores. The company made an inventory of fixed assets for the year 1995. The generation assets were 
represented by the thermal and hydroelectric power plants assets. 
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 Appendix 2: Data construction and sources 
 
Data Sources and explanation 
Operating revenue Data obtained from the financial statements that companies reported to the authority (CTE and
OSINERGMIN). The revenues are composed of: (1) sales to final customers, (2) others (incomes
deduced from other activities related to distribution) and (3) compensations. The last category was
excluded and was a component of the FCG and/or FOTAR.
Operating costs Figures taken from the financial statements that companies reported to the authority. These are
composed of: supplies, fuel, labour expenses, taxes, third-party services, management expenses,
provisions and other operating costs. This item is net of purchase of electricity, generation and
transmission payments.
Purchase of energy This data was also obtained from the financial statements that companies sent to the regulatory
authority. Before privatisation, the FCG (expenses) were allocated in this category. Two types of
FCG were distinguished: type 1 (expenses incurred for the purchase of electricity), type 2
(composed of different kinds of compensations). This last was composed of compensation for: (1)
source of energy, (2) economies scale and (3) market structure. Therefore for our calculations type
1 was taken as “purchase of energy” and type 2 was computed as non-controllable costs.
Generation & 
Transmission costs
For the years before 1994 they were calculated using two reports from CEPREL (Libro Blanco): (1)
The International Finance Corporation and Interandean Bank Informational Memorandum, and (2)
Coopers and Lybrand Diagnostic. For the period 1994-2007 this item was found in the annual
reports from the regulatory authority.
Operating controllable 
costs
These are operating cost excluding depreciation and restructuring and privatisation costs.
Operating non-
controllable costs
Before privatisation they are composed of: taxes (includes taxes on revenue), FCG, FOTAR and
Fund for electric development. For 1994 they include only taxes.
Restructuring and 
privatisation costs
Those costs that Government incurred before and after the sale of Electrolima and Electro Sur
Medio. These were obtained, from CEPREL (Libro Blanco), from the Ministry of Economy and
Finance – MEF (National Public Treasury Office) and from the Agency for the Promotion of Private
Investment – Proinversión (concluded process). These costs include: (1) expenses for national and
international consultants, (2) travels, (3) administration, (4) third-party services, (5) equipments, (6)
commissions for the sale of remaining shares in the stock market, (7) others.
Taxes and social 
contribution
This data is available since 1994 and was collected from the CTE and OSINERGMIN annual
reports as well.
Assets Assets were taken from CTE and OSINERGMIN annual reports for the period 1994-2007. For the
previous period, generation assets were obtained from Electrolima and Electro Sur Medio’s Libro
Blanco respectively. In the case of Electrolima, transmission assets were obtained from the
Ministerial Resolution No 164-93-EM-VME, 22/07/1993 in which the transmission assets that would
be transferred to “Empresa de Transmisión Eléctrica Centro Norte” were defined. 
Index and reference 
interest rate. 
IPM was taken from the National Accounting Regulatory Council (Ministry of Economy and
Finance) and the IPC from the Central Reserve Bank of Peru – BCRP. The reference interest rate
was taken from the BCRP as well. 
National accounts GPD per capita for the period 1994-2007 was taken from the World Bank Database (World
Development Indicators). For the period 2008-2015 we use the projections given by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF World Economic Outlook) 
Number of employees Collected from the annual reports from CTE and OSINERGMIN. Data is available since 1990
(Electrolima) and since 1994 (Electro Sur Medio).
Units distributed These are the net unit distributed to end customers. This data was taken from the authority’s
annual reports.
Electricity distribution 
companies’ 
concession area
Obtained from the companies’ website and also from the following Ministerial Resolutions: Luz del
Sur (107-96-EM), Edelnor (011-95-EM, 080-96-EM, 040-2006-EM), Ede Cañete (095-95-EM) and
Electro Sur Medio (066-94-EM, 091-96-EM, 032-2000-EM, 022-2002-EM)
Population, number of 
households and 
households with 
electricity
Data collected from the nationwide census of 1993 and 2005 provided by the National Institute of
Statistics and Information (INEI). Data from these two years were used for approximating the
annual population, number of households and households with electricity for the period 1994-2007. 
  
